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I. AMERICA THE VIRTUAL: SECURITY, PRIVACY, AND
INTEROPERABILITY IN AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD
Cyberthreats recently overtook terrorism as the number one global
threat to America, according to the 2013 global threat assessment
performed by the U.S. intelligence community.1 This special issue of
the American University Law Review represents the culmination of a
concerted effort to bring together scholars, legal practitioners,
industry representatives, and government officials to discuss and
debate the pressing issues surrounding cybersecurity in today’s
increasingly interconnected environment. This effort began in
October 2012 with a public symposium entitled America the Virtual:
Security, Privacy, and Interoperability in an Interconnected World. One of
the principal themes of the symposium was the growing threat that
online security breaches present to business, government, and
individual citizens. This Law Review issue offers reflections on the
symposium, original scholarship, and commentary that we hope will
further advance the debate.
A. Beyond the Fortress
Melanie Teplinsky delivered the opening remarks at the
symposium in her speech entitled Beyond the Fortress.2 She explained
that, for over a decade, the cornerstone of the U.S. approach to
cybersecurity has been vulnerability mitigation; that is building
stronger fortresses to protect against cyberthreats. While fortification
may offer protection against some cyberthreat actors, Teplinsky
argued that determined threat actors have the time, resources, and
motivation to defeat even the most extensive fortification. Such
determined actors may include nation-states, terrorists, and
cybercriminals.
Teplinsky described the special challenge that nation-state
cyberthreat actors pose to our economic and national security. First,
nation-state sponsored cyberespionage poses a serious threat to U.S.
economic security. State-sanctioned Chinese hackers are believed to
have been stealing not only military secrets, but valuable corporate
intellectual property for over a decade, to the detriment of America’s

1. See Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community:
Hearing Before the S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 113th Cong. (2013)
(statement of James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence), available at
http://intelligence.senate.gov/130312/clapper.pdf.
2. Welcome Remarks, AM. U. L. REV., http://aulawreview.org/index.php?view=vidlink
&catid=1:symposium-2012&id=154:welcome-remarks&option=com_vidlinks&Itemid=150
(last visited June 15, 2013).
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long-term competitiveness.3 Prominent examples of alleged Chinese
cyberoperations include Byzantine Hades,4 Night Dragon,5 Operation
Aurora,6 and Operation Shady Rat.7 Teplinsky also addressed the
3. Michael Riley & Dune Lawrence, Hackers Linked to China’s Army Seen From EU
to D.C., BLOOMBERG (July 26, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012
-07-26/china-hackers-hit-eu-point-man-and-d-c-with-byzantine-candor.html (reporting
that the stolen information includes seismic maps from oil companies, trade secrets
from patent law firms, and market analysis from investment banks).
4. Byzantine Hades refers to a decade-long series of attacks believed to have
been perpetrated by the Chinese military. Brian Grow & Mark Hosenball, Special
Report: In Cyberspy vs. Cyberspy, China Has the Edge, REUTERS (Apr. 14, 2011, 3:52 PM)
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/04/14/us-china-usa-cyberespionage-idUSTRE
73D24220110414 (announcing that secret U.S. State Department cables reveal that
the Chinese military was involved in “Byzantine Hades, a series of systems breaches,
and that “[a]n April 2009 cable even pinpoints the attacks to a specific unit of
China’s People’s Liberation Army”). These attacks are believed to have resulted in
the exfiltration of terabytes of sensitive information from the U.S. government and
private sector companies, including “designs for multi-billion dollar weapons
systems.” Id.; see also Jessica Bourquin, The Evolution of Cyber Espionage: A Case for
an Offensive U.S. Counterintelligence Strategy 13 (Oct. 14, 2011) (unpublished M.A.
thesis, Utica College) available at https://www.treadstone71.com/index.php/news-infowhitepapers/masters-in-cybersecurity-intelligence-and-forensics/doc_download/48-theevolution-of-cyber-espionage-jessica-bourquin; Michael Riley & John Walcott, China-Based
Hacking of 760 Companies Shows Cyber Cold War, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 14, 2011, 8:47 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-13/china-based-hacking-of-760-companies
-reflects-undeclared-global-cyber-war.html (noting that the target companies include
Google Inc., Intel Corp., and smaller companies like iBahn, a provider of Internet
services to hotels); Mathew J. Schwartz, Leaked Cables Indicate Chinese Military
Hackers Attacked U.S., INFORMATIONWEEK SEC. (Apr. 19, 2011, 1:09 PM),
http://www.informationweek.com/security/attacks/leaked-cables-indicate-chinesemilitary/229401866 (revealing that Chinese spear-phishing attacks have targeted U.S.
government agencies since 2002).
5. Night Dragon is the code name for a cyberespionage campaign leveled against
six global oil, energy, and petrochemical companies, including Exxon Mobil, Royal
Dutch Shell, and BP. The attack, which is believed to have lasted from 2008–2011, has
been described as a “systemic long-term compromise of [the] Western oil and gas
industry.” DMITRI ALPEROVITCH, MCAFEE, REVEALED: OPERATION SHADY RAT 2 (2011),
available at http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white-papers/wp-operation-shadyrat.pdf. Cyberspies are alleged to have stolen valuable intellectual property,
including bidding information; prospecting data, including computerized
topographical maps worth “millions of dollars” that show locations of potential oil
reserves; and highly sensitive confidential business information. Michael Riley,
Exxon, Shell, BP Said To Have Been Hacked Through Chinese Internet Servers, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 24, 2011, 3:26 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-24/exxonshell-bp-said-to-have-been-hacked-through-chinese-internet-servers.html The tools,
techniques, and network activities associated with the attack were traced back to
China. ALPEROVITCH, supra, at 2.
6. Operation Aurora refers to a successful cyberespionage campaign against
Google and thirty-three other major U.S. companies (reportedly including Intel,
Dow Chemical, Morgan Stanley, and computer security guru Symantec). Scott Shane
& Andrew W. Lehren, Leaked Cables Offer Raw Look at U.S. Diplomacy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
28, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/29/world/29cables.html (reporting
that leaked American diplomatic cables indicate that “China’s Politburo directed the
intrusion into Google’s computer systems” and that the “Google hacking was part of
a coordinated campaign of computer sabotage carried out [in part] by government
operatives”). While reports initially suggested that the cyberspies were primarily trying to
hack into Gmail accounts of Chinese dissidents as part of an effort to quell dissent,
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national security threat posed by nation-state supported cyberattacks
on critical infrastructure (CI), such as the August 2012 attack on the
world’s largest oil company, Saudi Aramco.8
Teplinsky concluded that U.S. cybersecurity policy needs to be
based not only on vulnerability mitigation, but also on threat
deterrence. She emphasized the need to utilize all elements of
national power—military, economic, and diplomatic—to deter
nation-state actors from engaging in cyberespionage and cyberwar.
She also suggested that increased attention to the private sector’s role
in deterrence may be warranted because the private sector owns the
vast majority of CI in the United States,9 is agile, and has more “eyes
on the ground” than the government. In addition, the private sector
may be able to help identify actors engaged in cyberespionage and
sophisticated cyberattacks and help raise the cost of engaging in such
activities.
B. The Promise and Peril of Being Interconnected, Interoperable, and
Intelligent
Cybersecurity poses particularly acute challenges for critical
components of the national infrastructure. The first symposium
panel, entitled The Promise and Peril of Being Interconnected, Interoperable
and Intelligent,10 examined cybersecurity implications for standards
development within the electric power and healthcare industries.
Jorge Contreras, Associate Professor at American University,
security experts later opined that the cyberspies were in fact targeting Google’s sensitive
systems and intellectual property. David Drummond, A New Approach to China, GOOGLE
OFFICIAL BLOG (Jan. 12, 2010), http://googlepublicpolicy.blogspot.com/2010/01/newapproach-to-china.html.
7. Operation Shady RAT refers to a five-year cyberspying campaign allegedly
perpetrated by the Chinese that successfully penetrated the computer networks of
more than seventy governments and major corporations, including thirteen defense
contractors, in fourteen countries. Approximately fifty of the targets were in the
United States. ALPEROVITCH, supra note 5, at 3–4; see Dean Takahashi, Black Hat’s
Spotlight Falls on McAfee’s Dmitri Alperovitch for Uncovering Cyber Spying, VENTUREBEAT
(Aug. 4, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://venturebeat.com/2011/08/04/black-hats-spotlightfalls-on-mcafees-dmitri-alperovitch-for-uncovering-cyber-spying (quoting Alperovitch
describing Operation “Shady RAT” as the “biggest transfer of wealth in terms of
intellectual property in human history”).
8. See Siobhan Gorman & Julian E. Barnes, Iran Blamed for Cyberattacks, WALL ST.
J. (Oct. 12, 2012, 7:38 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000087239639044465
7804578052931555576700.html (reporting that the attack used a computer virus to
destroy data on 30,000 Saudi Aramco computers).
9. Critical Infrastructure Sector Partnerships, DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs.gov/
critical-infrastructure-sector-partnerships (last visited June 15, 2013).
10. Panel 1: The Promise and Peril of Being Interconnected, Interoperable, and Intelligent,
AM. U. L. REV., http://aulawreview.org/index.php?view=vidlink&catid=1:symposium2012&id=155:promise-and-peril-of-interconnectivity&option=com_vidlinks&Itemid=150
(last visited June 15, 2013).
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Washington College of Law, moderated this panel. Professor
Contreras, who teaches and writes about technical standardization,
pointed out that standards are necessary for the interoperability of
products by multiple vendors.
Interoperability is critical in
communications and national infrastructure, including the national
power grid and the medical and financial establishments. The result
of the tens of thousands of standards in use today, he observed, is a
world that is massively interconnected. Professor Contreras then
raised the following question: does interoperability in critical
infrastructural assets present additional cybersecurity and privacy
challenges, or does it help to prevent and hinder cybersecurity risks?
To set the stage, Tom Kellerman, Vice President of Cybersecurity
for TrendMicro,11 gave preliminary remarks on technological
approaches to cyber defense.
Kellerman emphasized that understanding cyber offense informs
cyber defense, and he focused on the importance of understanding
one’s cyberadversaries.
Describing the current cyberthreat
landscape, Kellerman addressed the proliferation of targeted attacks,
professionalization of cybercrime, automation and commoditization
of cyberattack tools, and the evolution of mobile threats, including
the explosion in use of mobile malware. Kellerman also identified
several recent IT-related trends that challenge our ability to secure
cyberspace, such as the migration to cloud computing, the
consumerization of IT (and the associated “bring your own device”
phenomenon), the rise of social networking and social media, and
the explosion in the use of mobile devices. To address the evolution
of the cyberthreat landscape, Kellerman urged the development of
improved standards for browser security, application security, and email authentication.
Following Kellerman’s remarks, Dr. George Arnold, National
Coordinator for Smart Grid Interoperability at the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST), described the massive
networking effort currently underway to connect and bring
intelligence to the disparate elements of the national power grid.
Today’s electrical grid, which comprises more than 17,000 power
plants, 165,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines and 3200

11. Kellerman is a former Commissioner for the Commission on Cyber Security
for the 44th Presidency, serves on the Board of the National Cyber Security Alliance,
and is an adjunct professor at American University’s School of International Service.
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different electrical utility companies,12 relies on an infrastructure that
has remained largely unchanged for a century. The current Smart
Grid effort that NIST coordinates seeks to improve grid efficiency,
reliability, and sustainability by using a new generation of smart
meters, network sensors, distributed microgrids, and sophisticated
monitoring and management systems.
With increased
interconnection, however, comes increased vulnerability, both to
external and internal threats.13 NIST, other agencies, and the private
sector standards-development organizations charged with developing
the protocols that will enable Smart Grid interoperability have placed
a high priority on securing this key national resource. In addition to
security issues, the national Smart Grid will present challenges for
maintaining the privacy of data gathered from consumers and
households across the country. In an integrated Smart Grid system,
information ranging from subscribers’ financial and payment data, to
energy usage habits, scheduling of daily activities and vacations, and
the type and quantity of electrical appliances and devices used, will all
become vulnerable to external appropriation and inappropriate
use.14
Security and privacy issues also play a prominent role in the design
of standards for interoperable healthcare systems. Tim Andrews, Vice
President of the Booz Allen Hamilton health team, described the
potential benefits of moving toward intelligent, interconnected
healthcare records systems. These include first order patient care
consistency and improvement and second order population-level data
analysis for epidemiological and public health applications. With
interconnection, however, come heightened risks and vulnerabilities.
Health records contain a wealth of personal information about
individuals that, if compromised, could give rise to identity theft,
financial embezzlement, and healthcare fraud. The medical and
healthcare industry is highly fragmented and decentralized, even
more than the electrical power grid, involving millions of
independent physicians, hospitals, and software vendors.15
12. George W. Arnold, Remarks at the American University Law Review
Symposium: The Promise and Peril of Being Interconnected, Interoperable, and
Intelligent: A Smartgrid Perspective (Oct. 25, 2012) (on file with law review).
13. See, e.g., Richard Stone, A Call to Cyber Arms, 339 SCIENCE 1026, 1027 (2013)
(noting a 2011 report published by Chinese researchers that describes
“vulnerabilities in the western U.S. power grid”).
14. See, e.g., Ian Brown, Britain’s Smart Meter Programme: A Case Study in Privacy by
Design, INT’L REV. L COMPUTER & TECH. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 2),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2215646.
15. See Robert O’Harrow, Jr., Health-Care Sector Vulnerable to Hackers, Researchers Say,
WASH. POST (Dec. 25, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/health-
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Standardizing and securing a network comprised of disparate and
uncoordinated elements will be a tremendous technological and
legal challenge.
C. Cybersecurity & the Law: Efforts to Address Cybersecurity
The symposium’s second panel focused on recent legal and
legislative efforts to address cybersecurity and preserve civil liberties.16
Lucy Thompson, Chair of the ABA Section of Science & Technology
Law, moderated this panel and helped to draw out several themes.
First, the panelists emphasized that cybersecurity is a complex
problem with many different facets, and that legal and legislative
analyses of cybersecurity issues must distinguish not only among
different cyberthreat actors, such as nation-states, terrorists,
criminals, and malicious hackers, but also among different types of
cyberthreats.
Such cyberthreats include threats to critical
infrastructure, which could lead to loss of life or significant damage
to our economy; and threats to intellectual property, which could
affect our nation’s long-term competitiveness.
Second, the panelists generally agreed with Mike McNerney,
former Cyber Policy Advisory in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense, and Eric Wenger, Policy Counsel for Microsoft, that the
ongoing cybersecurity debate in Congress implicates many
longstanding and controversial issues. For example, how do we
balance improved cybersecurity that comes in the form of
information-sharing or continuous monitoring against the
importance of protecting privacy and civil liberties? Can the market
be relied upon to police itself when it comes to protecting critical
infrastructure? What is the government’s proper role vis-à-vis the
private sector in “.com” cybersecurity given that the Internet is largely
private-sector-owned and operated? Would legislative action, such as
setting voluntary cybersecurity standards for critical infrastructure as
proposed in the Cybersecurity Act of 2012,17 incentivize the right
behavior or inhibit innovation?
Wenger pointed out that the cybersecurity debate in the 112th
Congress reflected a fundamental disagreement over what the
care-sector-vulnerable-to-hackers-researchers-say/2012/12/25/72933598-3e50-11e2-ae
43-cf491b837f7b_story.html (noting that many medical device manufacturers do not
consider cybersecurity risks in manufacturing and medical professionals themselves
have already made mistakes leading to breaches).
16. Panel 2: Cybersecurity & Law, AM. U. L. REV., http://aulawreview.org/index.php
?view=vidlink&catid=1:symposium-2012&id=156:cybersecurity-and-law&option=com_
vidlinks&Itemid=150 (last visited June 15, 2013).
17. S. 2105, 112th Cong. (2012).
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cybersecurity problem is and which government institution is best
situated to address it. Some believe that the most important
cybersecurity problem to be solved in the near term is ensuring a
better flow of information between the private and public sectors and
that the intelligence community has the necessary expertise to lead
the way. The Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act18
(CISPA), the narrow information sharing legislation that passed the
House in April 2012, is based on this premise. Others believe that
the most important cybersecurity issue is ensuring that the private
sector adequately adheres to standards for critical infrastructure
protection and propose that the Department of Homeland Security
take the lead in creating a regulatory model. Both the Senate’s
Cybersecurity Act of 2012 and its Revised Cybersecurity Act of 201219
were based on this premise.
The panelists also discussed the role of the market in cybersecurity.
Harriet Pearson, a partner at Hogan Lovells working in the
Government Regulatory Practice and Privacy and Information
Management Practice and former Chief Privacy Officer for IBM,
eloquently argued that we are living in a historic age in which the
rapidity of technological change is putting incredible pressure on our
business and government institutions.
Pearson discussed how
technology is fundamentally altering the way in which our
organizations work and suggested that law, policy, and market
mechanisms are having difficulty keeping pace with these rapid
changes. She argued that the market is responding to the need for
greater security of various types, and that criticisms of the market for
not moving fast enough may be overstated given the enormity of the
changes the market must accommodate. For example, Pearson
argued that industry has made significant changes to address
cybercrime and identity theft, and that we are only in the early stages
of market response to intellectual property (IP) theft. Finally, she
emphasized the need to find policies that will incent the right
behaviors without dampening the innovation needed for both good
security and a robust economy.
Jessica Herrera-Flanigan, a partner at Monument Policy Group, built
on Pearson’s remarks, adding that although companies take
cybersecurity quite seriously, they are challenged by its increasing
complexity, including greater interconnectedness, increased reliance
on cloud services, and the trend toward “bring your own device,” which
18. H.R. 624 (113th Cong.) (2012).
19. S. 3414, 112th Cong. (2012).
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blurs the line between personal and business use of networked devices.
McNerney noted that despite recent SEC guidelines requiring
companies to report “material” information regarding cybersecurity
risks and cyber incidents,20 inadequate cybersecurity does not appear
to affect the valuation of today’s companies; he focused on the need
for maturation in insurance and litigation to change this dynamic.
McNerney’s comments led to a robust discussion regarding the
difficulty of assessing both the value of cybersecurity and the costs of
cybersecurity failures and the implications of this for the nascent
cyberinsurance market.
D. Internet Governance: Who Will Lead the Way?
The third panel of the symposium, entitled Internet Governance:
Who Will Lead the Way?, addressed the role of Internet governance in
shaping the cybersecurity technological, legal, and policy
environment.21 Laura DeNardis, Associate Professor at American
University, School of Communication, moderated this panel. She
pointed out that Internet governance goes beyond government
policies and national law, as technical design also plays a
governmental role, corporate policies, and global institutions. The
direction of Internet governance, often concealed in technical
complexities, is of extreme importance because it will determine the
direction of civil liberties online. One theme addressed was the
importance of preserving the multistakeholder model of Internet
governance that includes the involvement of private industry, civil
society, new global Internet governance institutions, and
governments.22 Paul Brigner, Regional Director of the North
American Bureau of the Internet Society (ISOC), emphasized that
the security and stability of the Internet depend on the preservation
of three Internet characteristics: (1) permissionless innovation,23 (2)
open access, and (3) collaboration. Brigner raised concerns about
international proposals that might threaten these ideals by imposing
a telecommunications model of regulation onto the Internet,
20. DIV. OF CORPORATE FIN., SEC, CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE: TOPIC NO. 2, CYBERSECURITY
(Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/cfguidance-topic2.htm.
21. Panel 3: Internet Governance: Who Will Lead the Way?, AM. U. L. REV.,
http://aulawreview.org/index.php?view=vidlink&catid=1:symposium-2012&id=157:
internet-governance-who-leads&option=com_vidlinks&Itemid=150 (last visited June
15, 2013).
22. INTERNET CORP. FOR ASSIGNED NAMES & NUMBERS, ICANN ANNUAL REPORT
2011 (2011) [hereinafter ICCAN REPORT], available at http://www.icann.org/en/about
/annual-report/annual-report-2011-en.pdf.
23. Permissionless innovation is innovation that can be accomplished without the
necessity for obtaining intellectual property permissions or clearances.
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affecting issues such as cybersecurity, billing, and quality of service.
He also stressed that meetings addressing the future of Internet
governance should be open and transparent, providing avenues for
multistakeholder dialogue and input. The Internet’s role as a shared
resource and its architectural blurring of time and space distinctions
present unique governance challenges, according to Rashmi
Rangnath, Director of the Global Knowledge Initiative at Global
Knowledge. Coordination is necessary for the Internet to function,
but who has the legitimacy to provide this coordination? Rangnath
explained that governance is the act of affecting behavior, ideally
reflecting common values. While democracy is the ideal model in the
physical world, multistakeholderism is the ideal model in the virtual
world. Multistakeholder Internet governance is not a monolithic
area, but it involves multiple policy areas such as infrastructure,
applications, protocols, and content.24 As such, Internet governance
mechanisms range from tools as diverse as copyright enforcement to
net neutrality policies to privacy.
Difficult questions about multistakeholderism, particularly in the
area of privacy, include the appropriate role of governments and
other specific stakeholders and the appropriate international forums
for input from civil society. What should the respective roles of the
various stakeholders be? J. Beckwith Burr, Chief Privacy Officer and
Deputy General Counsel at Neustar, addressed the question of the
role of government in Internet governance and, particularly, how
privacy plays out in a virtual world without national borders. One
typically thinks about public policy as mediated by governments but
this is not always the case in the Internet governance realm. In the
view of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers
(ICANN), decisions about the operation of country code top-level
domains should be managed by the associated country and Internet
community.25 But even in such a case, what if the relevant country
passes a law that compromises Internet principles?
Privacy is a similarly complex issue in the multistakeholder world.
International trade treaties, for example, usually include privacy
rules. But there are significant open debates about privacy, including
work in the standards body known as the World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C) to create “do not track” mechanisms and work in
open international debates about what information should be made

24. Id. at 9.
25. Id. at 21.
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public when you register a domain name.26 Thomas Smedinghoff,
partner at Edwards Wildman Palmer LLP working in the Intellectual
Property, Privacy and Data Protection, and Technology, Media and
Telecommunications Practice Groups, provided specific examples of
online privacy complexities, focusing on governance of specific data
transactions in various contexts.
E. Keynote: Leap-Ahead Privacy as a Government Responsibility in the
Digital Age
The privacy threats raised by previous speakers were echoed in the
keynote address delivered by Ivan Fong, Senior Vice President, Legal
Affairs, and General Counsel of 3M Co. and former General Counsel
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security,27 entitled Leap-Ahead
Privacy as a Government Responsibility in the Digital Age.28 Given the
many threats incipient in the online environment, Fong identified
two primary drivers justifying increased governmental involvement in
securing cyberspace: first, the government depends heavily on
technology and cyberspace for its own operations; and second,
government has a unique vantage point from which to observe and
understand global economic, political, and technological forces that
could give rise to cyberthreats. He assessed the range of current laws
and regulations that address cybersecurity issues, either directly or
indirectly, and found them largely inadequate.
Thus, Fong
recommended that government “leap ahead” with progressive,
forward-looking data privacy and security legislation and regulation,
rather than waiting for incremental change to occur through judicial
intervention.
II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The world of cybersecurity is fast-moving and several important
developments have arisen since the symposium was held in October
2012. First, in February 2013, President Obama issued an Executive
Order (EO) on cybersecurity that addressed information sharing as
26. See Peter Swire, Full Steam on Do Not Track, W3C BLOG (Feb. 12, 2013, 11:59
PM), http://www.w3.org/QA/2013/02/full_steam_on_do_not_track.html (reporting
that the W3C and a multitude of stakeholders have identified criteria for a successful
do not track standard and will now focus on its international aspects).
27. Although Mr. Fong delivered these remarks after his departure from his
position as General Counsel of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security in
October 2012, they were prepared by Mr. Fong in his official capacity during his
tenure with DHS and thus represent views consistent with those of the
Administration.
28. Ivan Fong, Leap-Ahead Privacy as a Government Responsibility in the Digital Age, 62
AM. U. L. REV. 1131 (2013).
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well as the development and implementation of risk-based
cybersecurity standards for critical infrastructure.29 With respect to
information sharing, the EO confirmed that it is U.S. policy to
improve cybersecurity information sharing by increasing the “volume,
timeliness, and quality” of cyberthreat information shared with the
U.S. private sector.30 The EO also put the President’s imprimatur on
the planned expansion to critical infrastructure companies of an
existing information-sharing program between the government and
defense industrial base companies.31 Moreover, under the EO,
unclassified versions of reports of cyberthreats to the United States
that identify a specific target must be rapidly disseminated to the
target.32 In addition to information sharing, the Order calls for the
collaborative development and voluntary adoption of a new
cybersecurity framework to include risk-based cybersecurity standards
for critical infrastructure.33
Second, in March 2013, the U.S. Director of National Intelligence
(DNI) identified cyber as the top global threat facing America,
stating “it’s hard to overemphasize its significance.”34 The next day,
President Obama invited select CEOs of CI companies directly to the
White House to discuss cybersecurity.35
Third, the 2013 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), a classified
document reflecting the “consensus view of the U.S. intelligence
community,”36 reportedly concluded that “the United States is the
target of a massive, sustained cyber-espionage campaign that is
threatening the country’s economic competitiveness.”37 According to
press reports, the NIE identifies China “as the country most
29. Exec. Order No. 13,636, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739 (Feb. 19, 2013).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community: Hearing Before the
S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 113th Cong. 5 (2013) (statement of James R. Clapper,
Director of National Intelligence), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/
Intelligence%20Reports/WWTA%20Remarks%20as%20delivered%2012%20Mar%20
2013.pdf.
35. Alex Mooney, President To Host CEOs in Situation Room for Cyber Security Chat,
CNN (Mar. 13, 2013, 1:22 PM), http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2013/03/13/president
-to-host-ceos-in-situation-room-for-cyber-security-chat.
36. Ellen Nakashima, U.S. Said To Be Target of Massive Cyber-Espionage
Campaign, WASH. POST (Feb. 10, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-0210/world/37026024_1_cyber-espionage-national-counterintelligence-executive-tradesecrets (“Some officials have pressed for an unclassified summary to be released
publicly, [but] . . . as a matter of policy, [the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence does] not discuss or acknowledge the existence of NIEs unless directed
to do so.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
37. Id.
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aggressively seeking to penetrate the computer systems of American
businesses and institutions.”38 Just days after the NIE was circulated,
U.S. information security company Mandiant released a report of
over sixty pages offering extensive evidence of Chinese espionage,39
including actual video of physical intrusion activities.40
Fourth, in the area of technical standards and interoperability, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has recently demonstrated a strong
interest in cybersecurity. In February 2013, the Commission filed a
Complaint against HTC America41 alleging that HTC’s smart phones
and tablet devices contained various security vulnerabilities, and that
the presence of such vulnerabilities constituted unfair and deceptive
practices under section 5 of the FTC Act.42 The action was resolved
with the FTC issuing a Consent Order under which HTC agreed to
modify specific security vulnerabilities identified by the Commission
and to report on security compliance for a period of twenty years.43
Some commentators have expressed concern that the Commission’s
action against HTC indicates its willingness to dictate cybersecurity
standards absent any regulatory or legislative guidance regarding the
scope, nature, or technical details of those standards.44 Peter
Frechette’s student Note, FTC v. LabMD: FTC Jurisdiction Over
Information Security is “Plausible,” but How Far Can It Go?,45 addresses
precisely these issues.
Finally, the executive branch has stepped up efforts to deal with
cyberespionage through diplomatic channels. In a March 2013
speech to the Asia Society, Tom Donilon, National Security Advisor to
the President, unequivocally set forth the expectations of the United
States with respect to China’s role in cyberespionage, saying:
38. Id.; see also David Barboza, In Wake of Cyberattacks, China Seeks New Rules, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/11/world/asia/chinacalls-for-global-hacking-rules.html (“American intelligence officials have . . . said
privately that they have evidence of Chinese government involvement in the [recent
hacking] attacks . . . .”).
39. MANDIANT, APT1: EXPOSING ONE OF CHINA’S CYBER ESPIONAGE UNITS (2013),
available at http://intelreport.mandiant.com/Mandiant_APT1_Report.pdf.
40. APT1: Exposing One of China’s Cyber Espionage Units, MANDIANT (Feb. 18,
2013), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6p7FqSav6Ho.
41. HTC America is the American arm of HTC, a Chinese company that
manufactures Android and Windows-based smart phones. HTC, http://www.htc.com/
us (last visited June 15, 2013).
42. Complaint, HTC Am., Inc., FTC File No. 122-3049 (Feb. 22, 2013), available
at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/1223049/130222htccmpt.pdf.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., Allison Grande, With HTC Deal, FTC Claims Power To Set Security Standards,
LAW360 (Feb. 22, 2013, 8:52 PM), http://www.law360.com/corporate/articles/417857
(discussing the HTC and FTC agreement and the industry reaction to it).
45. Peter Frechette, Note, FTC v. LabMD: FTC Jurisdiction Over Information
Privacy is “Plausible,” But How Far Can It Go?, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1401 (2013).
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First, we need a recognition of the urgency and scope of this
problem and the risk it poses—to international trade, to the
reputation of Chinese industry and to our overall relations.
Second, Beijing should take serious steps to investigate and put a
stop to these activities. Finally, we need China to engage with us in
a constructive direct dialogue to establish acceptable norms of
behavior in cyberspace.46

President Obama himself addressed the issue of nation-state
sponsored cyberintrusions in a March 13 interview, stating: “[w]e’ve
made it very clear to China . . . that, you know, we expect them to
follow international norms and abide by international rules.”47 When
newly elected Chinese President Xi Jinping took office on March 14,
2013, President Obama reportedly called to congratulate Xi and took
the opportunity to raise U.S. concerns about hacking.48 In the course
of the call, the two leaders reportedly “committed to engage in an
ongoing discussion to address the cyber issue.”49
The conversation between Obama and Xi appears at a minimum to
have accelerated formal diplomatic engagement on cybersecurity
between the two countries. On March 17, 2013, just days after the
Obama-Xi discussion, the new Chinese Premier Li Keqiang said: “I
think we should not make groundless accusations against each other,
and spend more time doing practical things that will contribute to
cyber-security,”50 and by mid-April, 2013, U.S. Secretary of State John
Kerry announced that the United States and China had agreed to set
up a cybersecurity working group.51
While the increased diplomatic engagement on cybersecurity is
encouraging, substantive progress will take time, and, as the U.S.
Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs has noted: “[i]t’s
important to have a dialogue on this, but it’s also important that the

46. Tom Donilon, Nat’l Sec. Advisor to the President, Remarks to the Asia
Society: The United States and the Asia-Pacific in 2013 (Mar. 11, 2013), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/11/remarks-tom-donilon-national
-security-advisory-president-united-states-a.
47. Steve Holland, Obama, China’s Xi Discuss Cybersecurity Dispute in Phone Call,
REUTERS (Mar. 14, 2013, 6:03 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/14/ususa-china-obama-call-idUSBRE92D11G20130314.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Terrill Yue Jones & Benjamin Kang Lim, China’s New Premier Seeks “New Type”
of Ties with U.S., REUTERS (Mar. 17, 2013, 4:02 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2013/03/17/us-china-parliament-hacking-idUSBRE92G02320130317.
51. Terril Yue Jones, U.S., China Agree To Work Together on Cyber Security, REUTERS
(Apr. 13, 2013, 11:37 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/13/us-chinaus-cyber-idUSBRE93C05T20130413.
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dialogue be a means to an end, and the end is really ending these
practices.”52
III. INSIDE THIS ISSUE
This special issue of the American University Law Review supplements
and advances the cybersecurity discussion held during its October
2012 symposium with a range of articles and commentary covering
different facets of the growing field of cybersecurity. In Regulating
Information Security in the Government Contracting Industry: Will the
Rising Tide Lift All the Boats?, Keir Bancroft observes the increasing
trend of federal agencies to mandate information security in their
dealings with private contractors. While Bancroft acknowledges the
overall societal benefit of reducing cybersecurity risks, he questions
the degree to which small organizations lacking the requisite
resources, technology, and experience will be able to comply with
steadily escalating federal security requirements. In these cases, he
argues that emerging businesses may be foreclosed from lucrative
government contracts. He then offers several potential solutions that
the federal government could implement to assist small businesses in
complying with new cybersecurity requirements.
In When Cyber Weapons End Up on Private Networks: Third Amendment
Implications for Cybersecurity Policy, Alan Butler offers a Third Amendment
analysis of military cyberoperations. Butler explores whether, and how,
the Third Amendment to the U.S. Constitution—that prohibits
quartering soldiers in a house during peacetime without the owner’s
consent—applies to U.S. military cyberoperations involving
government placement of software on privately-owned U.S. networks.
Butler makes a novel argument that military software placed on a
home or business network constitutes “quartering” of a “soldier” for
Third Amendment purposes. He then argues that the Third
Amendment confers not merely the narrow right to exclude the
military from one’s house, but the broader right to exclude the
military from one’s “private property,” including computers and
network infrastructure. Building on these arguments, Butler asserts
that military cyberoperations could implicate the Third Amendment,
and he concludes by exploring ways to design a national
cyberoperations strategy informed by Third Amendment principles.
In Hacker’s Delight: Law Firm Risk and Liability in the Cyber Age, Mike
McNerney and Emilian Papadopoulos explore the cybersecurity risks
and liabilities that law firms face. McNerney and Papadopoulos begin
52. Id.
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by exploring who is targeting law firms for cyberintrusion and why;
then, he warns that the potential for law firm liability arising out of
cyberinstrusions may be increasing. McNerney and Papadopoulos
caution that law firms affected by a cyberintrusion could be subject to
federal and state data breach notification requirements and SEC
disclosure requirements, and that those law firms could face FTC
enforcement action for inadequate data security in the event of a
data breach. Finally, McNerney and Papadopoulos identify several
practical steps that firms can take to protect themselves: implement
best practices in cybersecurity risk management, engage senior
leadership, encourage a culture of cybersecurity through education
and implementation of policies to control cyberrisk, harden networks
by implementing effective network security, and formulate crisis
response plans.
In his article Toward Cyber Peace: Managing Cyber Attacks through
Polycentric Governance, Scott Shackelford attempts to shed light on the
debate over cybersecurity by conceptualizing cyberspace as a form of
“pseudocommons,” a “shared global infrastructure” that is regulated
by a combination of public and private entities. Shackelford draws
on the work of Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom, whose
groundbreaking work on collective ownership and common resource
management revolutionized the field; he finds cyberspace susceptible
to vulnerabilities arising from both the well-known “tragedy of the
commons” and “anti-commons” paradigms.
After considering
potential organizational solutions to these problems, he argues that
cyber peace is most likely to prevail in an environment of polycentric
decision making, modeled, at least in part, on the participatory,
bottom-up structure of groups such as the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF).
In addition to the articles summarized above, this issue includes
three student-authored scholarly writings, each of which addresses a
discrete, but unsettled, question of cybersecurity law. In the student
Comment Identity Crisis: Seeking a Unified Approach to Plaintiff Standing
for Data Security Breaches of Sensitive Personal Information, Miles
Galbraith explores a circuit split on the issue of standing in data
breach cases. Galbraith agrees with the holdings of the U.S. Courts
of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth Circuits that an increased risk
of identity theft arising out of the theft or loss of personal data
constitutes a cognizable injury for purposes of Article III standing,
and he rejects the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit’s view
that standing is lacking in the absence of actual misuse of
compromised data. Galbraith argues that analogous areas of tort law
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support his conclusion that plaintiffs should have standing because
theft or loss of personal data constitutes a cognizable injury.
In the first of two student Notes, FTC v. LabMD: FTC Jurisdiction
Over Information Security is “Plausible,” But How Far Can It Go?, Peter
Frechette addresses the implications of FTC v. LabMD for the FTC’s
enforcement authority in the data security realm. Section 5 of the
FTC Act makes it unlawful to engage in “unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce,”53 and Frechette explains how
LabMD may challenge the FTC’s authority to regulate unfair data
security practices by way of enforcement actions against companies
that fail adequately to safeguard sensitive consumer information.
In the second student Note, Limitations on Employee Liability Under
the CFAA After WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, Danielle
Sunberg explores an unresolved three-way circuit split over the
proper interpretation of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
provision criminalizing access to a computer “without authorization”
or by “exceeding authorized access.”54 At issue is the applicability of
this provision to rogue employees who access their company’s
computer network using valid login information and then steal
confidential data from the network in violation of their employer’s
terms of use. Sunberg explains that the U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeals for the First, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits—adopting a
contract approach—have held that employees “exceed authorized
access” when they violate a corporate network’s terms of use; the
Seventh Circuit—adopting an agency approach—has held that
authorization to access the network is terminated when an employee
violates his duty of loyalty to his employer; and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit—in WEC—and the Ninth Circuit—
adopting a code-based approach—have held that there is no
“unauthorized access” when an employee accesses a company
network using the employee’s valid login credentials. Sunberg
explains that the Fourth Circuit’s WEC opinion widened the existing
circuit split and exacerbated the need for resolution from the
Supreme Court or Congress55 to provide certainty to employers.
53. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2006).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a).
55. Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D–Cal.) has introduced a bill known as “Aaron’s Law”
to address the circuit split through an amendment to the CFAA, and the House
held hearings on the CFAA issue on March 13, 2013. Investigating and Prosecuting
21st Century Cyber Threats: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism,
Homeland Sec. & Investigations of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013).
Aaron’s Law is named after Aaron Swartz, a brilliant twenty-six-year-old Internet
activist who tragically committed suicide in January 2013 while facing
prosecution–and potentially thirty-five years of jail time—for violating the above-
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CONCLUSION
Cybersecurity and cyberthreats have risen to prominence in the
national public discourse. Private industry, governmental actors, and
civil society have recognized these issues as critical to national
security, economic competitiveness, and individual rights. We are
confident that the timely subjects raised in this issue of the American
University Law Review represent only the beginning of a debate that is
sure to continue for years to come.

referenced CFAA provision. Swartz, who fervently believed that information should
be made available to the public for free, was being prosecuted for breaking into
MIT’s computer system and downloading nearly five million articles from a
subscription-based academic research database called JSTOR.

